Beyond Carbon Markets

Published on *Transnational Institute*

Author(s):Oscar Reyes
Author(s):Tamra Gilbertson

The headlines generated by the carbon trading mechanisms at the heart of the
Kyoto Protocol, most notably the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), tell a
story of a scheme in trouble. But why has it caused such controversy?

Carbon trading is a complex system which sets itself a simple goal: to make
it cheaper for companies and Governments to meet emissions reduction
targets. The Kyoto Protocol saw industrialized countries (described as
“Annex 1”) commit to cutting greenhouse gas emissions by 2012 to levels 5.2
per cent lower than those of 1990. At the same time, a series of “flexible
mechanisms” were agreed to, which meant that these targets need not be met
domestically.

The CDM is the largest such mechanism, with almost 1,800 registered projects
as of September 2009 and over 2,600 further projects awaiting approval.
Based on current prices, the credits produced by approved schemes could
generate over $55 billion by 2012. The CDM takes the form of carbon
“offsetting,” which allows companies, international financial institutions
and Governments to finance “emissions-saving projects” outside the Annex 1
countries.

Although carbon offsets are often presented as emissions reductions, they do
not actually reduce emissions. At best, they move reductions to where it is
cheapest to make them, which normally means a shift from Northern to
Southern countries. Greenhouse gas emissions continue to be made at one
location on the assumption that an equivalent savings will happen elsewhere.
The projects that count as “emissions saving” range from building
hydro-electric dams to capturing methane from industrial livestock
facilities.

These “savings” are calculated according to how much less greenhouse gas is
presumed to be entering the atmosphere than would have been the case in the
absence of the project. But no ways exist to demonstrate that it is carbon
finance that makes the project possible. Researcher Dan Welch sums up the
difficulty: “Offsets are an imaginary commodity created by deducting what
you hope happens from what you guess would have happened.” Estimates vary,
but academic analysis of existing projects suggests that between one third
and three quarters of projects do not represent “emissions savings” by any
reckoning. The companies behind such projects are paid to do what they would
have done anyway, while the credits allowed companies in industrialized
countries to exceed their emissions cap.

*Easy pickings*
Beyond this, one of the most frequent justifications put forward for carbon
offsets is that they should ensure that the cheapest reductions are made
first. What is cheapest in the short term is not the same as what is most
environmentally effective or socially just, however. The cheapest abatements
tend to be generated by loopholes and generous subsidies for the deployment
of existing technologies, rather than stimulating shifts to more sustainable
development paths.

As of September 2009, three quarters of the offset credits issued were
manufactured by large firms making minor technical adjustments at a few
industrial installations to eliminate hydroflurocarbons (HFCS) (refrigerant
gases) and nitrous oxide (N2O)(a by-product of synthetic fibre production).
This picture is unlikely to change dramatically by the time the Kyoto
Protocol’s first commitment period expires. By the end of 2012, HFC and N2O
credits are still expected to account for the largest share of the CDM (28.5
per cent and 14.4 per cent respectively), followed by hydro-electricity
projects (10.8 per cent). By comparison, solar power is expected to account
for just 0.03 per cent of CDM credits by 2012.

As Michael Wara of Stanford University puts it, “The CDM market is not a
subsidy implemented by means of a market mechanism by which CO2 reductions
that would have taken place in the developed world take place in the
developing world. Rather, most CDM funds are paying for the substitution of
CO2 reductions in the developed world for emissions reductions in the
developing world of industrial gases and methane.” In fact, many of these
emissions do not even occur in the developed world—where production
facilities have voluntary opted to destroy HFCs without the use of emissions
trading. Wara estimates that a straightforward subsidy to regulate HFC-23
emissions would have cost less than €100 million, yet by 2012, up to €4.7
billion in carbon credits will have been generated by such projects.

*A fossil fuel subsidy*
Proponents of the CDM suggest that a new balance of future projects will
gradually move closer to incentivising cleaner energy and more sustainable
development. Yet the evidence does not support this conclusion. The most
obvious cases here are the plethora of fossil fuel projects that are
supported by the CDM. To apply for the scheme, a project simply needs to
prove that it is cleaner than the norm for existing power production in the
region or country where it is located. As new plants are generally more
efficient than old, this is rarely a difficult task.

A recent study of new gas-fired power stations in China, for example, found
that all twenty-four new Combined Cycle Gas Turbine plants under
construction between 2005 and 2010 had applied for CDM subsidies. A second
example involves new “supercritical” coal-fired power plants, which have
been eligible for CDM credits since autumn 2007—despite the fact that coal
is amongst the most CO2 intensive sources of power. Fifteen projects had
sought validation under this methodology as of September 2009. This sets up
a perversely circular structure where, instead of envisaging a rapid
transition to clean energy, the CDM is subsidizing the lock-in of fossil
fuel dependence through providing incentives for new coal-fired power
stations in the South, rather than renewable energy infrastructure based on
local needs. With the credits that these new plants will generate, the CDM
is at the same time encouraging a continued reliance on coal-fired power
stations in the North, as well.

*A greener future?*
The growth of CDM investment in fossil fuel power generation is not the
whole story, however, as proponents of the scheme might still claim that it
will expand investments in “renewable” sources at a similar rate.

Typically, the calculations for hydroelectric projects assume that they will
replace energy that would otherwise have been sourced from fossil fuels. Yet
most hydropower projects submitted for CDM validation are expected to start
generating credits within 12 months of their validation. Since hydropower
plants normally take several years to build, the likelihood is that most
projects were under construction prior to their beginning the CDM validation
process. The local environmental and social impacts of such projects are
frequently severe. A similar assessment could be made of biomass power
projects, which simply tend to count the methane (CH4) emissions that are
avoided because it is burned rather than allowed to biodegrade—without
considering the huge emissions caused by cutting down forests or draining
carbon-rich peatlands to set up the plantations that provide biomass
feedstock.

The attempt by carbon offset promoters to distinguish between “good” and
“bad” projects misses the point, since even the most renewable projects are
inserted within a system that generates credits to carry on polluting
elsewhere. Such projects not only perpetuate the old problems of coal, oil
and gas; they often promote local conflict as well. Not designed to deal
with the real complexities and intricacies of communities and livelihoods,
they require enormous quantities of land, water and machinery, and are not
set up to benefit the local communities or ecology. The resulting conflicts
often come as a surprise to idealists convinced that carbon offset projects
will bankroll community-friendly renewable energy, with administrative costs
of $100,000 and upwards, the CDM does not fund such initiatives.

*Different paths*

The failings of the CDM are not simply problems in how the rules are
designed, or teething problems in its implementation, but are fundamental to
the scheme itself. It was designed to look for the cheapest cuts and found
that those involved cheap deployment of existing technologies by large-scale
industry and power producers. The proposals on the table at Copenhagen to
reform and expand the CDM do not address these fundamentals. New “sectoral
crediting” schemes, which change the nature of the Nationally Appropriate
Mitigation Actions developing countries agreed to adopt as part of the 2007
Bali Road Map, would expand offsetting with even weaker checks and balances.

If a cleaner future is the goal, then the process should start elsewhere.
Clean infrastructure investment tends to require upfront public
funding—which should come largely from industrialized countries, since they
predominantly caused the problem. Such funding is no guarantee of success,
however, unless a decentralized governance structure is adopted that allows
for meaningful citizen participation and sensitivity to local contexts,
allowing for the adaptation and improvement of locally-adapted industrial
and agricultural techniques, and engaging in a bottom-up assessment of real
energy needs.

A further significant requirement is to break with the logic of offsetting
itself, which asks developing countries to clean up their act so that
companies in Annex 1 countries can carry on polluting as usual. Instead of
stimulating new commodity markets, the targets and obligations placed on
industrialized countries should be met domestically. A plethora of existing
regulations, performance standards and incentives exist to help guide this
path, ranging from “feed-in tariffs” for renewables, to emissions output
limits on power producers and heavy industry. With Annex 1 countries having
done the most to cause climate change, their rapid and binding adoption of
more meaningful domestic action remains the fundamental stumbling block on
the road to tackling climate change justly and effectively.

Originally published in UN Chronicle

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